Susan Wolf

The essay "Susan Wolf – Asymmetrical Freedom" discusses Asymmetrical freedom of Wolf. According to Wolf, an agent’s actions are psychologically determined only on condition that his actions are determined by personal interests. By this, he means that his desires or values, and own interests are wholly determined by his environment or heredity. If people’s actions are determined, there is a high probability of the idea of psychological determinism being true. Considering what not being determined by his interests would mean for the actions of an agent, or for an agent to be capable of acting despite his interests, Wolf argues that the agent can act against everything that he cares about and what he believes in. For instance, if a son of an agent was in a burning building, yet the agent is standing and watching the building consumed by fire, then a person could think that such behavior ought not to be regarded as an action, but as spasms that are beyond the control of the agent. If it is an action, then they are so bizarre that an agent who did not bother to help may have been insane to have the ability to perform it. Wolf’s views suggest that if people require an agent to be psychologically undetermined, they cannot expect him to be an agent of good morals. This is on grounds that if people expect that his interests do not determine his actions, then probably they cannot be determined by his ethical or moral interests. However, if people expect that his interests should not be determined by something else….
We believe that his actions are determined by the precise kinds of interests and that the right sort of reasons determines their interests. On the other hand, an agent who is not determined psychologically has no ability to carry out actions that are right. If his actions can never be suitably correct, then in doing right actions, he can never go wrong. One problem emerges from this situation, and that is that the undetermined agent seems to be free from moral reasons. Consequently, the satisfaction of the state of freedom tends to overpower the satisfaction of the state of value. Philosophers have got intuitions wrong, since there is an asymmetry in people’s intuitions concerning freedom that has been for a long time been overlooked. Consequently, it seems that the answer to the issue of free will can only be found in two options: either the verity that the action of an agent was determined will always be compatible with him being responsible for the action or the fact that the action of the agent was determined will often rule his responsibility out. Wolf suggests that the solution lies in the idea that both the incompatibilities and compatibilities are wrong. To be responsible beings, we need suitable combination of indetermination and determination. Susan Wolf’s views on the issue that being psychologically compelled or determined by good is compatible with the compelled agent being responsible for his action is plausible. This is due to the reason that an agent cannot be blameworthy in his morals if he is determined in the way he acts. In my view, determination is compatible with the responsibility of an agent to perform a good