PSYCHOLOGICAL/COGNITIVE MODELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS By Psychology The of the School The and where it is located
Psychological/Cognitive Models of Consciousness: Baars vs. Edelman
Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace (GW) theory and Edelman’s The Dynamic Core characterize how the brain engenders conscious mental content. Edelman supposes that re-entrant neural activity in the thalamocortical structure has an influence on the conscious experience. The two theorists present a similar hypothesis that guide perceptions, but with some slight comparisons. While Edelman’s theory hinges on history, Baars theory focuses on primary consciousness.
Baars and Edelman affirm that biological evidence has a considerable bearing on phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 2007, 481). The subjective conscious experience has varied distinguishable phenomenal properties that have overlying neural mechanisms (Raffone and Pantani, 2010, 580). A perfect neuronal combination determines consciousness and global accessibility (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005, 397). According to Edelman, consciousness depends on the perception of the brain on the prevailing situation. Phenomenal consciousness is a raw idiosyncratic feeling ornbsp.visual illusion while access consciousness characterizes reason and available information. The perception of the brain explains consciousness in lucid dreams and virtual imaginations (Voss, Schermelleh-Engel, Windt, Frenzel, and Hobson, 2013, 8).
There has been a successful unfolding of the biology of life, which has enabled humans to gain an understanding of monumental and covert phenomenal (Seth, 2012, 1). Brains are biological organs that determine consciousness, as seen in the Global Workspace perspective. Jackson (1986) presents an interesting argument that one cannot sense a colour if they have not seen the colour before. It takes a great deal of imagination and power, explained through physicalism, to figure out such a fact (Jackson, 1986, 292). Shoemaker (1982) presents a similar argument, spelling out that different human consciousness determines naïve perceptions that arise from colour. In addition, this consciousness may differ at different times (Shoemaker, 1982, 358).
List of References
Block, N., 2007, Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 30, 481 – 548.
Chakravarthi, R., n.d., Consciousness. PowerPoint presentation.
De Loof, E., Verguts, T., Fias, W., amp. Van Opstal, F., 2013, Opposite Effects of Working Memory on Subjective Visibility and Priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Doi: 10.1037/a0033093
Edelman, G., Gally, J. and Baars, B., 2011, Biology of consciousness. Front. Psychol., 25 January 2011 | Doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004.
Jackson, F., 1986, What Mary didn’t Know. Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Vol. 83, No. 5 (May 1986), pp. 291-295.
Maia, T. and Cleeremans, A., 2005, Consciousness: converging insights from connectionist modelling and neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Vol.9 No.8 August 2005.
Raffone, A. and Pantani, M., 2010, A global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 580–596.
Seth, A., 2012, Putting Descartes before the horse: quantum theories of consciousness. Phys Life Rev 291.
Shoemaker, S., 1982, the Inverted Spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Vol. 79, No. 7 (Jul. 1982), pp. 357-381.
Voss, U., Schermelleh-Engel, K., Windt, J., Frenzel, C., and Hobson, A., 2013, Measuring consciousness in dreams: The lucidity and consciousness in dreams scale. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 22, Issue 1, March 2013, Pages 8–21.